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Contract as Evil
Peter Linzer*
Contract is, of course, often good. It permits parties to negotiate terms that are specific to
their needs, something statutes can’t do. But contract is often evil and used for evil ends,
particularly because much of contract theory and doctrine is unconcerned with the
distribution of power; information and shrewdness between the parties and is based, in
part, on a romantic view of contract, emphasizing its basis in free will and liberty. This
almost deification of Contract blinds those who follow it to the very absence of free will
and liberty when the ability to deal in contract is unbalanced. The current dialogue about
contracts of adhesion and the question whether they should even be considered contracts
requires us to take a new look at contract. The use of contract to limit constitutional and
other rights based on a notion of voluntary waiver raises serious issues about whether we
should be skeptical about the assumed good of contract. We need contracts, but we need
also to rethink what we mean by contract and whether the formalistic conservative
libertarian approach to it needs to be reined in.
This Article looks at Margaret Jane Radin’s argument that adhesion contracts are not
really contracts and should be treated more through tort law, and looks briefly at the
progression of product liability from contract to tort to strict liability. The Article also
consider whether the model of agency regulation should be applied when traditional
contract reasoning is overwhelmed by the actual facts of a supposed bargain. The Article
then examines judicial approval through contract reasoning of unfair or even dishonest
conduct in a number of quite different contexts. Sometimes the good guys win, but too
often they don’t because contract is said to beat them.

* Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. A.B., Cornell, 1960; J.D., Columbia,
1963. During this Symposium, I stated how much I admire Professor Charles L. Knapp and how important
Chuck’s work has been for contract writ large. His contemporary contributions to the debate over predispute arbitration “agreements” are particularly relevant to several points I try to make in this Article.
See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp. Opting In or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of Individual
Contracts, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 95 (2006). While I, and others, frequently speak of “consumer contracts,” I
mean what Chuck has aptly described as “individual contracts.” In the cited article, Chuck wrote:
By this I mean not a contract between individuals, but a contract between a flesh-and-blood
individual, on the one hand, and a commercial enterprise on the other. . . . [F]or our purposes here
the contract of an individual worker (as contrasted with a collectively bargained labor contract)
has enough in common with the ordinary consumer contract to treat them together.
Id. at 120.
My excellent editors have been concerned with my use of “contract,” “contracts,” and “Contract.”
I use the singular to mean the concept of contract, rather than specific contracts or specific doctrine in the
law of contracts, as in “jus” rather than “lex” for law in Latin, or “droit” rather than “loi” in French.
E.g., Grant Gillmore, The Death of Contract (1974). I capitalize Contract mostly to indicate how it
becomes personified, like some sort of god.

[971]

N - Linzer_19 (EGK) (1) (Do Not Delete)

972

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

5/21/2015 12:01 AM

[Vol. 66:971

Contract often aids evil. Government regulation—thoughtful but serious regulation by
Congress, legislatures, administrative agencies and courts—is not antithetical to freedom
of contract. It is needed to protect those who lack power and skill and consequently, the
very free will and liberty that are supposedly the basis of contract.
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Of course, contract is often good. It can do things that statutes usually
can’t. A statute usually acts prospectively and broadly; it can’t anticipate all
scenarios and who will play what role in them. Negotiated contracts can
be drafted and fine-tuned by the people who know the most about them,
and can be renegotiated or modified if something new comes up. And
they can be worded precisely to the parties’ needs, unlike mandatory clauses
prepared by the government or some NGO. Thus, it is reasonable to
argue that outsiders—whether courts, administrative agencies, legislatures,
or even well-meaning third parties—should usually keep their hands off
contracts and leave the parties to do what they know how to do.
And there are aspects of contractarianism that are romantic—it is
based on free will and “liberty,” and to those who buy in, it means that
unless you agree by contracting for more duties, the government shouldn’t
be able to make you do more than the minimal duties of a citizen: pay
taxes, defend against enemies, and obey the criminal laws.
Contract is often described as private lawmaking; this notion has an
important philosophical cousin, “freedom of contract.” Freedom of contract
blurs two related concepts: first, that the government should normally not
interfere with private contracts and second, that the government has very
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limited power without actual consent, whether by individuals or businesses.
2
The latter public law concept is undergoing something of a rebirth. Roscoe
Pound and Samuel Williston challenged it as a mechanical and simplistic
3
4
idea a century ago, and the Supreme Court still solidly rejects it. With
respect to the overlap between private and public freedom of contract, in
the last month of the Hoover Administration, Morris Cohen argued that
5
contracts are intrinsically part of public law. Jean Braucher, whose very
recent death is mourned by everyone in the contracts community, built
on Cohen’s thesis two generations later to make a strong claim that
contract law needed to be regulatory, not the automatic handmaiden of
6
private power. The issue has been made central to contract scholarship
1. From the famous high Victorian words of Sir George Jessel, M.R.:
[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of full
age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their
contract when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be enforced
by Courts of justice.
Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, (1875) 19 L.R.Eq. 462, 465 (Eng.). While Jessel’s words
are often still quoted, Friedrich Kessler made the important point that “‘freely and voluntarily’ should not be
underemphasized.” Friedrich Kessler et al., Contracts: Cases and Materials 8 n.30 (3rd ed. 1986).
2. See generally Bernard H. Siegan, Economic Liberties and the Constitution (2d ed. 2006).
Additionally, almost any post on The Volokh Conspiracy, any publication by the Cato Institute, or any
article by Randy Barnett would illustrate this point nicely.
3. See generally Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale. L.J. 454 (1909) (arguing that the
concept of equal rights between employee and employer is a fallacy, but courts persist in it because of
mechanical jurisprudence and their concept that law overrides the facts of actual conditions); see also
Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 Cornell L.Q. 365, 379 (1921) (“The extent to which freedom
of contract should be limited inevitably becomes a question of degree to which not even an attempt at
an answer can be made without reference to time, place, and circumstance; and there is nothing in our
Constitutions which should prevent reasonable experiment to aid in the decision. It is no longer possible
for those who would like to decide such questions by a mere appeal to liberty and freedom of contract
to avert what Huxley called ‘“the tragedy of a fact killing a theory,” by putting a Constitutional sanction
behind a cherished dogma.’” (citations omitted)).
4. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934) (“[N]either property rights nor contract
rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental
with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.” (internal citations
omitted)); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963) (“Whether the legislature takes for its
textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord Keynes, or some other is no concern of ours.” (citation
omitted)). To many observers, including myself, freedom of contract, though dressed in Commerce
Clause drag, was the basis of “the Broccoli Horrible” in “the Obamacare Case.” See Nat’l Fed. of
Indep. Bus. v. Sibelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012). “The Broccoli Horrible” was the argument that
the Commerce Clause barred the federal government from reaching anyone who had not previously
engaged in commerce, the “horrible” being that if eating vegetables was good for the nation as a whole (like
widespread medical insurance), the government could make us all buy broccoli. Id. Chief Justice Roberts
relied upon this heavily in his opinion announcing the judgment, but not the Opinion of the Court, id. at
2608, as did the Scalia-Kennedy-Thomas-Alito dissent, id. at 2650 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito
JJ., dissenting). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg scathingly satirized this argument in her opinion. Id. at
2619 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 586 (1933).
6. Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law,
47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 697, 699 (1990); Peter Linzer, A Contracts Anthology 54, 106 (2d ed. 1995).
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because of the recent explosion of writing on contracts of adhesion —the
take-it-or-leave-it contracts put forth by suppliers, usually sellers of goods
or services but also by employers, franchisors, bankers, mortgagees, and
Internet advertisers.
There are aspects of contract that justify its role as a “private
lawmaker” and times when judicial interference is ill-advised, just as there
are times when people who do not consent to public responsibilities should
8
not be held to them in spite of majority rule.
A lot of what I’ve just written represents contract as good, but much
of contract is its evil twin: contract as power. Contracts are something we
worship simply because they are individual manifestations of Contract,
that concept that summons up notions of liberty and free will. But too
often Contract permits the strong and the adept to win over the weak
and the trusting. It rewards those who know how to use the rules better
than those who don’t. Contract views the world as evenly matched even
when those on one side are less educated, less familiar with the rules, less
knowledgeable about the factual background of the deal, and less well
advised. It is not the concern of Contract that some do not protect
themselves as well as others—those who use a contract to their advantage.
There are also times when interference with nominally private
transactions or the imposition of public duties upon those who do not
9
want to do them are not merely acceptable, but imperative. In public law
matters, this interference may be intended to prevent freeloaders or
because a controversial statute has been passed after those dissenting
have put forth their ideas and used their full power. In private
transactions, government intervention is particularly important because
contracts are often used for evil ends and by evil means. Frequently, this
evil comes from the exercise of disproportionate power or disproportionate
access to necessary information by one side. Our Anglo-American
contract system has traditionally paid little attention to these imbalances,
but it is time to realize that this treatment of contract—as between two
equals on an equal playing field—has little to do with reality. It is not
necessary to sacrifice capitalism to allow intervention to redress at least
some greater amount of imbalances. These imbalances cause most of the
evil. But our exalting of Contract is their handmaiden.

7. See infra notes 10–14.
8. Obvious examples arise under the First Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. I.
9. Compliance with antitrust laws, federal labor laws, and zoning regulations are three illustrations.
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I. How Adhesion Contracts Are Forcing Us to Figure Out What
We Really Mean by a Contract
The idyllic description of contract works sometimes, but only
sometimes. Surely, a very high percentage of what we consider contracts
are either contracts of adhesion or involve parties of unequal bargaining
power. In fact, the question of whether consumer transactions are even
contracts has become prominent, largely because of an enormous recent
academic outpouring, including Margaret Jane Radin’s much discussed
10
11
Boilerplate; Oren Bar-Gill’s Seduction by Contract; Nancy Kim’s Wrap
12
Contracts; an important Festschrift inspired by, and including, the writings
13
14
of Stewart Macaulay, and two symposia about adhesion contracts. And
then there is the American Law Institute’s new Restatement Third of
15
Consumer Contracts, which many think is misnamed and should rather
16
speak of “Consumer Transactions.”
A. “But It Isn’t Contract”
When he observed the Charge of the Light Brigade during the
Crimean War—673 British light cavalrymen charging the cannons of a
Russian redoubt, which killed or wounded 278 of them—Pierre Bosquet,
Marshall of France, said “C’est magnifique, mais ce n’est pas la guerre. . .

10. See Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the Rule
of Law 19–32 (2013).
11. See generally Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in
Consumer Markets (2012).
12. See generally Nancy S. Kim, Wrap Contracts: Foundations and Ramifications (2013).
13. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business—A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc.
Rev. 55 (1963), reprinted in Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay: On the
Empirical and the Lyrical 1 (Jean Braucher et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations]; Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read—Businesses Run by IBM
Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 1051 (1966), as reprinted in Revisiting
the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, supra, at 20 [hereinafter Macaulay, Private
Legislation]; Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships,
Complexity, and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, 66 Mod. L. Rev. 44 (2003), as reprinted in Revisiting
the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, supra, at 35 [hereinafter Macaulay, Real and Paper].
14. See generally Symposium, “Boilerplate”: Foundations of Market Contracts, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 821
(2006); Symposium, Contracting Out of the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1 (2006); see
also 6 Peter Linzer, Corbin on Contracts § 26.5 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 2010) (discussing adhesion
contracts).
15. Oren Bar-Gill of Harvard, and Omri Ben-Shahar, of the University of Chicago, are the reporters
for this Restatement, along with Florencia Moratta-Wengler of New York University as Deputy Reporter.
Am. Law Inst., Annual Report 2013–2014, at 14 (2014).
16. My statement is based on conversations I’ve had with law teachers in the contracts and consumer
law fields, but support for this view can be found in the books and articles, supra notes 5, 6, 10, 12. In my
reading, Orin Bar-Gill’s excellent book, Seduction by Contract Law, supra note 11, makes a very strong
argument for treating consumer transactions as different from contracts, but Professor Bar-Gill has told
me that he does not agree with me that the name of the Restatement should be changed.
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C’est de la folie.” “It’s magnificent, but it isn’t war. It’s madness.” Perhaps
the rationale of adhesion contracts as somehow involving volition and
consent is not as absurd as the 673 men charging the Russian guns and
18
being mowed down as they rode into the Valley of Death, but the more
I read and think about consumer transactions, the more I wonder whether
it isn’t madness to regulate them through contract, treating long-distance,
impersonal take-it-or-leave-it transactions as if they were negotiated with
actual bargaining and actual consent by the consumer, franchisee,
employee, or small business person. Maybe we can reform contract law
sufficiently to do something about the way that dominant parties use
contracts of adhesion to eliminate class actions, jury trials, warranties,
consequential damages, local courts, or, for that matter, courts entirely.
Perhaps it is better to segregate consumer transactions into a separate
19
area of contracts, as we have done with insurance. Maybe, though, it is
better to rethink the entire enterprise, as recent books and articles have
suggested, either expressly or by exposing underlying issues that are
20
inconsistent with the kind of contract law we think of as the norm. Maybe
it is time to create a new law to govern these transactions without giving
the dominant sellers, employers, franchisors, and the like, unlimited
authority to decree the governing law, and without giving the other party
any alternative but doing without.
Even more, perhaps it is time explicitly to recognize that a contract
is not just a matter of private dealing, but also a matter of public law that
affects our entire society. This is not a new idea. The Sherman Act has
21
forbidden “contracts in restraint of trade” since 1890, and the century-

17. Martin Hollis, The Presidential Address: Reasons of Honour, in 87 Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 1, 2 (1986); Robert Debs Heinl, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations
24 (1966).
18. In Alfred Tennyson’s words:
Half a league, half a league,
Half a league onward,
All in the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred.
“Forward the Light Brigade!
Charge for the guns!” he said.
Into the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred.
Alfred Tennyson, The Charge of the Light Brigade, The Examiner, Dec. 9, 1854, at 780.
19. Insurance law frequently uses a stronger duty of good faith, construes contracts against
insurance carriers more stringently than general contract law, and regulates adhesion contracts more
rigorously. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 527, 677–78, 761–64 (4th ed. 2004); see also 6 Linzer,
supra note 14, § 26.12.
20. See supra notes 4–8.
21. “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2015).
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long battle over “freedom of contract” and economic substantive due
process is a staple of the constitutional law course. But it is time to think
hard about the role of our polis, in what is ostensibly a private deal between
two parties.
Take, for example, Radin’s Boilerplate, in which she pointed to the
22
lack of consent and negotiation, the intrusion by contracts of adhesion
23
on the rule of law, and the argument by law and economics scholars that
contract terms should be deemed part of a product rather than an
24
independent legal overlay. Radin built on this to ask why we should not
use the law of torts, or perhaps that of strict products liability, to deal
with a “product” whose contract of adhesion has left its user with defective
25
rights. Radin’s idea is that if we treat defective products as a strict liability
without requiring proof of fault, why can’t we treat adhesion contracts as
“defective” because they take away the weaker party’s rights as strict
liabilities of the dominant party, and then give remedies based on the
26
impact on the nondominant party’s rights? The difference between this
approach and the law of contracts is that in the latter, one’s rights flow
from the contract itself or from the breach of a duty in the contract.
Radin’s approach has the nondominant party’s rights coming from a
27
social system—the law itself —without fraud or other tort-like behavior
attributed to the dominant party. Under Radin’s approach, the mere act of
using power to deprive the other party of rights through contract would
trigger remedies, just as liability flows from using commerce to sell a
28
defective product.
Then consider how contract law assumes that contracts consist of
29
rational parties contracting with one another. But in Bar-Gill’s Seduction
by Contract, he said:

22. See Radin, supra note 10, at 19–32.
23. See id. at 33–51.
24. In a subchapter entitled “The Contract-as-Product Theory (the Law-and-Economics View of
Boilerplate),” Radin points particularly to Judge Frank Easterbrook’s opinion in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), and cites Arthur A. Leff’s Contract as Thing, 19 Am. U. L. Rev. 131 (1970),
and Lewis A. Kornhauser’s Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 Calif. L. Rev. 1151 (1976), as the
wellsprings of the idea. Radin, supra note 10, at 99–101. Leff was not a law and economics type but a
brilliant and provocative thinker who probably would not have supported the use of his article as a
justification for market dominance.
25. This is the burden of the last quarter of Radin’s book, “Escaping Contract: Other Remedial
Possibilities” and “Afterword: What’s Next for Boilerplate?”. See generally Radin, supra note 10, at 187–248.
26. She speaks of a possible tort of “Intentional Deprivation of Basic Legal Rights.” Id. at 211–12.
27. See id.; see also MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053–54 (N.Y. 1916).
28. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 1 (1997); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A (1965).
29. See, e.g., Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson (1875) 19 L.R.Eq. 462, 465 (Eng.);
see also Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability,
70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203, 1206–07 (2003).
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We consumers are imperfectly rational, our decisions and choices
influenced by bias and misperception. Moreover, the mistakes we
make are systematic and predictable. Sellers respond to those mistakes.
They design products, contracts, and pricing schemes to maximize not
the true (net) benefit from their product, but the (net) benefit as
perceived by the imperfectly rational consumer. Consumers are lured,
by contract design, to purchase products and services that appear more
attractive than they really are. This Seduction by Contract results in a
30
behavioral market failure.

Bar-Gill is a behavioral economist and a co-Reporter of the American
Law Institute’s new Restatement Third of Consumer Contracts. He does
not appear to reject the use of contract law in consumer matters.
Nonetheless, his very thesis illustrates the difficulty of applying contract
analysis to a shadow show that the dominant party manipulates, even if
31
in open view of its audience.
Still another challenge to our traditional detached approach to power
in contract comes from a new book honoring the fiftieth anniversary of
Stewart Macaulay’s seminal article, Non-Contractual Relations in Business:
32
A Preliminary Study. While Macaulay focused on the failure of
businesspersons to follow contract precedent in their commercial dealings,
his famous article is an important landmark in questioning how contract
law affects and should affect supposedly contractual dealings. The new
book, a Festschrift (though Macaulay would probably find the term
pretentious) called Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart
33
Macaulay, is a collection of essays by and about Macaulay’s work. In
addition to Macaulay’s 1963 article, the book includes excerpts from two
of his later articles. In Macaulay’s 1966 article, he spoke of organizations
that “attempt to use contract ideology to legislate privately; sometimes
34
successfully, sometimes not.” Though Macaulay has been pointing out
for more than fifty years what we all should have seen long ago, his more
recent writings are equally if not more persuasive. For example, in 2003,
he concluded an article on form contracts, writing: “At the very least, if
our courts allow those who draft written contracts to impose terms

30. Bar-Gill, supra note 11, at 2.
31. See Korobkin, supra note 29, at 1216–44; see also Russell Korobkin, The Borat Problem in
Negotiation: Fraud, Assent, and the Behavioral Law and Economics of Standard Form Contracts, 101 Calif.
L. Rev. 51, 92–93 (2013). Korobkin is also a behavioral economist and he may not agree with my reading of
these two valuable works. The latter article is discussed at some length in Part II B.2 below.
32. See generally Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 13. Though it was not published in
a law review, Macaulay’s article was said to be “the most widely cited paper on contracts of the last 50
years.” Robert E. Scott, The Promise and Peril of Relational Contract Theory, in Revisiting the Contracts
Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, supra note 13, at 105, 105 (citing Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law
Review Articles Revisited, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 751, 767 tbl.1 (1996)).
33. See generally Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, supra note 13.
The book’s perfect subtitle, “On the Empirical and the Lyrical,” describes two of the many sides of
Macaulay, a prince of scholars and human beings.
34. Macaulay, Private Legislation, supra note 13, at 1051.
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inconsistent with expectations and the implicit dimensions of contract, we
can expect reformers to demand that the law police those bits of private
35
legislation that masquerade as contracts so that they are fair.” Several
of the articles in the Macaulay Festschrift raise similar issues, as do other
recent articles.
It is troubling that each of these quite different discussions exposes a
type of transaction in which traditional contract and restitution (and
perhaps property law) doesn’t work right, generally because our traditional
approach leaves some parties exposed, whether because of the wording
36
37
of a contract of adhesion, manipulation of advertising and incentives,
or because one side had never even thought the other side was going to
make money from their activities and thus never thought to protect
38
themselves. This begs a major question: Should we rethink contract as
we know it?
B. That Was No Contract, That Was My Lunch
39

Radin’s book, Boilerplate, has got lots of people talking and blogging,
particularly about her argument that consumer adhesion contracts are not
contracts at all, and shouldn’t be overseen by contract law, but by a new
regime unconstrained by traditional contract doctrine. She leads one to
doubt that we should call any legal document a contract when it involves
no real agreement, no negotiation or bargaining, little understanding of
terms by the nondominant party, and no opportunity to change terms,
except by walking away. Radin was expanding on the theme put forward
by the apologists for adhesion, who argue that the form contract is simply
part of the product—if you pay less, we analyze the transaction very
differently. If, for instance, you like saving money by buying a used or
dented washer, why should we not treat the new washer with a disclaimer of
merchantability the same way? Defenders of the “adhesion contract as

35. Macaulay, Real and Paper, supra note 13, at 79.
36. See Radin, supra note 10, at 19–32.
37. See Bar-Gill, supra note 11, at 2.
38. See infra note 70 and accompanying text; Korobkin, supra note 29, at 1206–07.
39. See Radin, supra note 10. Despite my great respect for both of them, I wish Radin and BenShahar had not used the term “boilerplate,” rather than “adhesion” or “form contracts” in their books,
though I’ll concede that “boilerplate” has punch rhetorically. Most lawyers that I know use “boilerplate”
to mean standard provisions, regardless of whether they are the subject of negotiation. In an arms-length,
well-negotiated contract between parties of equal strength, the parties may agree that they need standard
and sometimes uncontroversial provisions such as a choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clause, a merger clause,
a clause dealing with the role of captions or of where notices should be sent, and all of these needs are
frequently dealt with through standardized terms, either from form books or old contracts in someone’s files,
sometimes well-written, sometimes not. These terms are usually called “boilerplate,” meaning standardized.
They may raise questions of style and draftsmanship, but in a non-adhesion contract they often do not
involve an imbalance of power. For a 675-page group of essays on how to draft standard provisions in
negotiated contracts, see Tina L. Stark, Negotiating and Drafting: Contract Boilerplate (2003).
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40

thing” usually argue that the benevolent sellers (they would say
“licensors”) will share their savings with you by reducing the price, an
apology that Radin does a good job of undermining. The bigger objection to
her argument is that there is something nihilistic or even apocalyptic about
the removal of form contracts from the contracts kingdom. Yet, as Radin
points out, that has been the process throughout the history of products
41
liability.
The usual starting point of products liability is Winterbottom v. Wright,
an 1842 decision of the Court of Exchequer in which Winterbottom, a
coachman for the Royal Mail who had been injured by a defective mail
coach, attempted to recover from Wright, who had contracted with the
Postmaster-General (who was immune from suit) to supply the coach and
42
keep it in good repair. Lord Abinger, the Chief Baron, took considerable
care to support his conclusion that no duties were owed unless they had
been created by contract, the only exceptions being “public duties,” such
43
as innkeepers’ duties to guests, and violations of the law of nuisance.
Since Winterbottom was not in privity of contract with Wright, the court
held that Winterbottom had no claim against him for his injuries, though
they were caused by Wright’s failure properly to perform his contractual
44
duties, which ran only to the Postmaster-General.
For nearly seventy-five years after Winterbottom, the courts chipped
away at the notion that a manufacturer (or, as in Winterbottom’s case, a
maintenance contractor) had no duty to the ultimate user, until Judge
Benjamin Cardozo, destroyed the doctrine in Macpherson v. Buick Motor
Company, with a careful delineation of the case law, but really in three
sentences:
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb,
when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of
contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the obligation
45
where it ought to be. We have put its source in the law.

This worked well when negligence could be shown, but it didn’t help
Bertha Chysky, a waitress who had been furnished, as part of her lunch,
with a piece of cake containing a nail that punctured her gum and cost
46
her three teeth. She could not prove negligence against the wholesale
47
baker so she sued for breach of warranty. The New York Court of
Appeals, only seven years after Macpherson and with Cardozo joining
40. The concept is usually traced to Leff’s Contract as Thing, but one wonders how enthusiastic
Leff would have been about where his idea has been taken. See Leff, supra note 24, at 136.
41. Radin, supra note 10.
42. (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch.).
43. Id. at 405.
44. Id. at 405–06.
45. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
46. Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 139 N.E. 576, 577 (N.Y. 1922).
47. Id. at 578.
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the majority, reversed a verdict in her favor because “privity of contract
does not exist between the seller and such third persons [like Bertha],
48
and unless there be privity of contract there can be no implied warranty.”
Yet in the same era in other states, courts were focusing on the nature of
food to expand liability, until it became widespread law that implied
warranties were not limited to contractual privity and until Justice Roger
Traynor, in 1944, could use the fact that an exploding Coke bottle
contained “foodstuffs” to buttress his opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Company, an exploding Coke bottle case and the wellspring of
49
strict products liability.
C. “Who Is Affected by This Contract?”
By focusing on the subject matter of the transaction rather than the
formalities of contract or the assumption that tort is based on fault and
wrong, Cardozo, Traynor, and many other judges and writers were able
to transform the issue to a question of who should bear the cost when a
product injures a consumer, regardless of contract or fault. In Escola,
Traynor made the point that if even the most carefully constructed bottle
had a defect that caused injury, it made more sense for the manufacturer
to include the cost of compensation in the price of the product, spreading
the loss to all consumers rather than putting all of the loss on the loser in
50
the injury lottery. All consumers bore the risk of injury equally, so
compensation should be a matter involving all consumers. Traynor, and
eventually section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, thought
beyond the narrow terms of negligence, res ipsa loquitur, or contract, to
51
fairness within the society as a whole. Similarly, today’s courts,
administrative agencies, Congress, and state legislatures should focus not
on the mechanics of contract, but on the many factors relied upon by
Radin in considering whether to restrain the power of sellers to deprive
consumers of rights that the social system has granted them and that
form contracts attempt to take away.

48. Id.
49. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
Since then, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) eliminated the privity requirement.
See U.C.C. §§ 2-1 to 2-7 (6th ed. 2010).
50. Escola, 150 P.2d at 441–43.
51. See Restatement Third of Torts: Products Liability § 1 (1977); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A (1965).
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D. What Is Private? What Is Public?
Others have not necessarily bought into the amputation of adhesion
contracts from “contracts,” but they have recognized how one-way form
contracts do not fit in with traditional views of contract. Revisiting the
52
Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay looks in that direction.
Macaulay’s 1963 American Sociology Review article refers to non53
contractual relations in business, and many of the essays in the Festschrift
are about business contracts, but not all. Only three years after his 1963
article, Macaulay wrote Private Legislation and the Duty to Read—Business
54
Run by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards. The
reference to IBM machines may sound quaint but, like Kurt Vonnegut’s
stories (Epicac) and novels (Player Piano) from the fifties and sixties that
saw today’s problems of technology and people in an era of room-sized
computers with thousands of vacuum tubes, Macaulay’s article still rings
true. In a footnote, Macaulay cited Lawrence Friedman’s discussion of how
a discrete area such as labor law and occupational licensing has been spun
off from general contract jurisprudence, and he made reference to his own
55
discussion of automobile franchising. In a fairly short discussion of
consumers, Macaulay considered both case-by-case policing and legislation
of standard terms, as in fire insurance contracts, but did not go much
56
beyond that. But in his article Bambi Meets Godzilla, Macaulay did look at
consumer and deceptive trade practices laws and argued that they should
be an integral part of the contracts course, even though they had frequently
been distorted into windfalls for well-informed consumers (often lawyers)
57
rather than as weapons of defense for less sophisticated consumers.
Others in Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay
have built on Macaulay’s work to suggest that consumer transactions
should be treated as a separate area within contract law. For instance, Dean
Robert E. Scott has co-written several articles arguing for judicial
58
restraint when sophisticated businesses are dealing with each other. He
52. See generally Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, supra note 13.
53. See generally Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 13.
54. See generally Macaulay, Private Legislation, supra note 13.
55. Id. at 1056 n.18.
56. Id. at 1062.
57. Stewart Macaulay, Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections on Contracts Scholarship and Teaching vs. State
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Statutes, 26 Hous. L. Rev. 575, 582–89 (1989).
58. See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal
and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1377, 1383 (2010)
(discussing interfirm collaboration through a combination of “formal and informal methods of enforcement
through a process [they] term ‘braiding’”); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux,
119 Yale L.J. 926, 934 (2010) (“Our theory applies to contracts between sophisticated firms.”); Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541, 544 (2003)
(delineating four categories of bargaining: (1) firm to firm, (2) individual to individual, (3) firm sells to
individual, and (4) individual sells to firm; stating that their theory applies only to contracts between firms).
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builds on this point of view to argue that such a hands-off policy makes
no sense with consumer transactions because the factors that pervade
59
“Big Contracts” between big companies are absent. Bob Gordon
described the Scott approach this way:
Robert Scott generously and sympathetically notes the basic kinship
between law-and-economics and law-and-society scholars’ treatment of
relational contracting. He proposes a sort of Peace of Augsburg, in
which the theories and methods of each school would predominate in
the study of different domains of contracting: law-and-economics . . .
over contracts between firms, where the main task for law and lawyers
is helping the parties realize their joint goals; law-and-society . . . over
contracts between firms and unequal partners like consumers and
employees, where the law has to worry about abuses of superior power
60
and knowledge.

This makes a great deal of sense to me. So does Gordon’s essay, which
focuses on contract’s ambiguous position on the cusp of both public and
61
private law.
Much of the recent discussion has focused on adhesion contracts.
While many fine writers have proposed general solutions like Todd Rakoff’s
62
presumption of unconscionability, any general rule that requires a
consumer or employee to litigate whether a clause violated a standard
will favor the dominant party—a repeat performer with lawyers on
63
retainer. I have argued that legislation or judicial rulemaking forbidding
64
specific terms in individual adhesion transactions is the best approach.
Examples include choice of a distant forum, mandatory arbitration, limits
on consequential damages, and waivers of warranties and jury trials. It is
an appropriate area for state legislative and consumer agency work, and,
more importantly, for federal congressional or Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) intervention, particularly because this issue
has almost nothing to do with freedom of contract. By far the most
important and controversial issue currently is predispute consumer
arbitration. The CFPB, which is now taking a close look at mandatory
predispute arbitration, looks like a promising candidate, particularly
since Congress expressly punted the issue to it in the Dodd-Frank Act:

59. See generally id.
60. Robert W. Gordon, Is the World of Contracting Relations One of Spontaneous Order or Pervasive
State Action? Stewart Macaulay Scrambles the Public–Private Distinction, in Revisiting the Contracts
Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, supra note 13, at 49, 66–67.
61. See generally id.
62. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173,
1190, 1195, 1206 (1983).
63. 6 Linzer, supra note 14, § 26.5[B]; Peter Linzer, “Implied,” “Inferred,” and “Imposed”: Default
Rules and Adhesion Contracts—The Need for Radical Surgery, 28 Pace L. Rev. 195, 208–17 (2008); see
Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market Concept and Its Lessons for Policing
Standard Form Contracts, 7 Small & Emerging Bus. L. 393, 416 & nn.127–31 (2003).
64. See 6 Linzer, supra note 14, § 26.5[C]; Linzer, supra note 63, at 208–17.
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The Bureau, by regulation, may prohibit or impose conditions or
limitations on the use of an agreement between a covered person and a
consumer for a consumer financial product or service providing for
arbitration of any future dispute between the parties, if the Bureau finds
that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions is in the public interest
and for the protection of consumers. The findings in such rule shall be
65
consistent with the study conducted under subsection (a).

The CFPB was the brainchild of Senator Elizabeth Warren, who
used to teach contracts. If the agency uses the power Congress has given
66
it, states and other federal agencies may be able to resolve by regulation
many of the problems of adhesion contracts, and by doing so, cure many
of the evils they help to impose. After all, the holder in due course doctrine
had been around for hundreds of years. It provided that a maker of a
negotiable instrument could not raise most defenses against a holder
presenting it for payment. This made sense when the transactions were
relatively individual and when commercial paper was widely used as money,
and it makes sense for some commercial transactions today. But for
generations sellers of consumer products that sold on credit made use of the
doctrine by selling the consumer’s promissory note to a “different” company
(which theoretically was not affiliated with the seller), making the second
company a holder in due course. Thus, Bob’s Appliance Company would
sell its consumer paper to Steve’s Finance Company. If the product was
defective and the consumer protested by not paying, Steve’s (now the
holder in due course) would sue her and the consumer (the maker of the
note) was barred from raising the defense that the product didn’t work. So
the consumer had to pay the finance company, despite the product being
defective. Finally, the Federal Trade Commission ended all this, simply
by banning the holder in due course doctrine in consumer transactions.
That happened nearly forty years ago. There is plenty of agency power,
federal and state, that can be used against adhesion contracts and the like,
and we should actively seek its use.

II. The Evil Side of Contract
A. The Romance of Contract
Adhesion contracts are not, however, the only evil of contract. The
romantic view of contract, to which I alluded at the beginning of this
Article, is a major part of contract’s bad side. Not only did this view lead

65. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1028(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 2003–04 (2010) (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2015)).
66. The CFPB’s preliminary study, published in 2013, seems strangely tentative given the widespread
criticism of mandatory predispute arbitration clauses in consumer transactions. See Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau, Arbitration Study Preliminary Results 7 (2013).
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to the half century of “freedom of contract” undermining social legislation,
but it has also been used simultaneously, for instance by Randy Barnett,
one of the leading conservative constitutional libertarians and a wellknown writer on contract law, to justify enforcing, as contracts, adhesions
68
with only the faintest consent. At the same time, it has been used to
limit “presumed consent” to economic and social laws that impose duties
on unwilling individuals to laws that do not violate what Barnett views as
69
the people’s “retained fundamental rights.” Why the person who is
found to be bound by an adhesive arbitration clause does not have a
“retained fundamental right” to a jury trial is not clear to me. But there
are many other aspects of the ascendancy of contract reasoning that seem
wrong to me. I offer a few examples in Part II.B.
B. Some Examples
1.

Euchred by Contract (1) : Virtual Work, Gamers, and Bloggers

In a most striking look at a “new” form of employment, Miriam Cherry
of St. Louis University has coined the term “virtual work” and has written
70
extensively on it and related topics. By “virtual work,” she means work
done by many workers whose product is often a very small piece of data
assembled by more highly skilled professionals into a sophisticated
71
product. The work usually involves computers and often is carried out
in a nontraditional workplace—that is, in a home or coffee shop or on a cell
phone while sitting on a park bench, for example. Many of these workers
get paid on a piecework basis and earn much less than the minimum wage
but are designated as “independent contractors” in an end user license
agreement (“EULA”) or a form contract, which permits their “nonemployer” to claim that they are not covered by the Fair Labor Standards
72
Act (“FLSA”). The FLSA covers “employees” and expressly exempts

67. This trend lasted from at least Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 5782 (1897), to West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). It actually can be traced back to Chief Justice Roger Taney’s notorious
opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 438 (1856). There, rejecting the claim that the slave, Dred
Scott, had been freed without his master’s consent when the master took him into a free territory, Taney
wrote: “[A]n Act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property,
merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory . . . could hardly be
viewed with the name of due process of law.” Id. at 450. Note that the “liberty” was the right to own
slaves and the “property” was Dred Scott.
68. See Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 627, 635 (2002).
69. See Randy E. Barnett, We the People: Each and Every One, 123 Yale L.J. 2576, 2601–02 (2014).
70. See generally Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 Ga. L. Rev. 951 (2011)
[hereinafter Cherry, Taxonomy of Virtual Work]; Miriam A. Cherry, The Gamification of Work, 40 Hofstra
L. Rev. 851 (2012) [hereinafter Cherry, Gamification]; Miriam A. Cherry, Virtual Whistleblowing, 54 S.
Tex. L. Rev. 9 (2012); Miriam A. Cherry, Working for (Virtually) Minimum Wage: Applying the Fair
Labor Standards Act in Cyberspace, 60 Ala. L. Rev. 1077 (2009).
71. Cherry, Taxonomy of Virtual Work, supra note 70, at 953–56.
72. See 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2015).

N - Linzer_19 (EGK) (1) (Do Not Delete)

May 2015]

5/21/2015 12:01 AM

CONTRACT AS EVIL

987
73

independent contractors from the definition of an employee. Many
factors go into the determination of who is an employee, and the FLSA
has been interpreted to cover more workers as employees than common
74
agency law tests. The EULA and similar contracts that are obviously
contracts of adhesion militate against the worker being defined as an
employee, a definition that would ensure receipt of at least the minimum
wage. Defining these “virtual workers” as contractors is appealing to
employers for reasons beyond the FLSA. For example, the Supreme
Court applies narrower common law agency tests in cases falling under
75
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), and the
agency that administers the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”)
has said that it will follow the Supreme Court’s ERISA decisions in OSHA
76
cases. Thus, it is likely that the EULA and other contracts of adhesion will
be upheld in other non-FLSA areas, such as eligibility for unemployment
77
payments or workers compensation. For many of these “virtual workers”
doing piecework data gathering on their computers and cell phones, it
seems unlikely that they actually agreed that they were not entitled to
these benefits. Even if they were aware that they were agreeing that they
were “independent contractors,” they almost certainly did not know what
that designation was costing them in terms of legal entitlements.
Another form of “virtual work” that Cherry discusses and criticizes
involves people being encouraged to take part in games or game-like
78
environments, either for fun or as a matter of public service. Video
gamers are invited to “play” in ways that enable researchers to use the
79
players’ work to make money—not for the players, but for the promoters.
Though what the gamers do ends up making money for someone else,
80
the “beneficiary” disclaims any contractual or restitutionary liability and
disputes any property interest belonging to the virtual worker. While
these pseudo-games do not involve third-party beneficiary contracts, the
scenario turns the concept of the incidental third-party beneficiary on its
head. In standard contract doctrine, if A makes a promise to B that benefits
a non-party, C, C does not gain rights unless B intends to benefit her. In
the gaming scenario, there are only two parties and there may not even

73. Id.
74. Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers
Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 251, 257–58 (2006).
75. Since the Supreme Court uses a narrower definition in ERISA cases, and since the FLSA is limited
to employees and not contractors, use in other contexts of the narrower common law agency definition of
“employee” means that fewer people are covered for minimum wages and similar benefits.
76. Stone, supra note 74, at 261–62.
77. While Stone does not specifically discuss unfair designation of workers as contractors, this
conclusion appears to follow from her discussion of non-FLSA forms of atypical work. See id. at 262–70.
78. See Cherry, Gamification, supra note 70, at 852–54.
79. See id. at 855.
80. See id. at 856.
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be any contract. A invites B to play or to do research that is entertaining
and perhaps competitive and takes the benefit of it but says that she has
no duty to compensate B for B’s efforts nor any obligation to share the
resulting benefit. After all, B had fun, and there was no agreement.
This, in turn, leads to a similar though not identical issue, with the
same empty result for the Bs of the world. Cherry looked at the unsuccessful
lawsuit by Huffington Post (“HuffPo”) bloggers who were outraged, to say
the least, when their blogging turned into a $315 million deal for Arianna
81
Huffington and her backers, but nothing for them. The HuffPo bloggers
lost for three reasons: (1) because the courts held that they had been
given notice that HuffPo was a for-profit corporation (the profits coming
from advertising rather than selling the blogs), (2) because the bloggers
understood that they would not be paid for their work, and (3) because
they did not submit their writings with intent to be paid. We can even
assume that the HuffPo promoters had no idea, at least at first, that their
new idea would be fabulously successful and would enable them to sell it
for hundreds of millions in only a few years. We can further assume that
the bloggers did not submit their writings to make money from HuffPo. The
circumstances had changed, however, in an unanticipated way, and the
bloggers surely were not submitting their writings as a gift to enable the
promoters to make a fortune. There was no express contract between
HuffPo and the bloggers. Under these circumstances, an expansive view
of restitution would have supported the bloggers’ argument, whether for
the $115 million they said their contribution was worth or for
considerably less, but for still a significant proportion of the capital gain
achieved by the HuffPo promoters. In the actual case, both the district
court and the Second Circuit focused only on the lack of agreement and
HuffPo’s true (but incomplete) disclosures of their financing to the
82
bloggers when they submitted their writings. This focus on the lack of
agreement is a common, though not universal approach to restitution—
83
essentially straitjacketing it in contract-based formalism.

81. Miriam A. Cherry, Cyber Commodification, 72 Md. L. Rev. 381, 381–84, 441–43 (2013) (discussing
Tasini v. AOL, Inc. (Tasini I), 851 F. Supp. 2d 734 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 505 F. App’x 45 (2d Cir. 2012)).
82. See generally Tasini v. AOL, Inc., 505 F. App’x 45 (2d Cir. 2012); Tasini I, 851 F. Supp. 2d 734.
83. For an expansion on these views, see Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and
Reliance, Contracts and Torts, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 695, 696–98, 759–75.
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Euchred By Contract (2): The Parol Evidence Rule and Russell
Korobkin’s “Borat Problem”

Russell Korobkin is a thoughtful writer and a highly regarded
behavioral economist. More than ten years ago, he put forth views on the
84
“bounded rationality” of consumers rather similar to those in Bar-Gill’s
85
recent Seduction by Contract. Korobkin’s thesis, in summary is as follows:
[N]on-drafting parties (usually buyers) are boundedly rational
decisionmakers who will normally price only a limited number of
product attributes as part of their purchase decision. When contract
terms are not among these attributes, drafting parties will have a
market incentive to include terms in their standard forms that favor
themselves, whether or not such terms are efficient. Thus, there is no a
priori reason to assume form contract terms will be efficient . . . . [T]he
proper policy response to this conclusion is greater use of mandatory
contract terms and judicial modification of the unconscionability doctrine
86
to better respond to the primary cause of contractual inefficiency.

On its face, this sounds sensible, but Korobkin puts more emphasis on what
he views as efficiency than I do, since I think that what many economists
term “efficiency” discounts as externalities many costs to the “little guy.”
In my view, the parol evidence rule (“PER”) fits that description,
87
which makes it one of the evil aspects of contract. I have read many cases
where I had little or no doubt that the extrinsic proof probably told the
true story, but it was excluded because the court considered the written
word a bar to further evidence. This emphasis on the written word is
particularly devastating when a party’s apparently true claim of fraud is
barred by the words of the contract she signed. Korobkin teaches contracts,
yet his discussion of the PER in his recent article on the litigation resulting
from the smash hit movie Borat shows lack of attention to the critics of the
PER, generally, and seems naïve about the motives of contract drafters and
their ability to use the PER to cover their own fraud or quasi-fraud.
As Korobkin described it:
In the 2006 movie Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit
Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan, English comedian Sacha Baron Cohen
plays the role of an outrageously inappropriate Kazakhstani television
reporter, Borat Sagdiyev, who journeys across the United States to film a

84. From what I can gather, Korobkin uses “bounded” simply to mean “limited.”
85. See generally Korobkin, supra note 29; Bar-Gill, supra note 11.
86. Korobkin, supra note 29, at 1203.
87. The PER basically states that when parties to a contract have made an agreement—almost always a
writing reflecting the final word and complete statement of the agreement, which supersedes all previous
agreements on the subject matter—they will not be allowed to present evidence of earlier agreements
or of extrinsic evidence contradicting the writing. There are so many variations and exceptions to the PER
that many writers deny that the PER is a rule at all. Arthur L. Corbin, who wrote half a volume on the PER,
disliked it intensely and almost always either put it in quotation marks or referred to it as “the so-called
parol evidence rule.” See, e.g., 3 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 573 (1960).
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documentary about American culture. In the course of his travels, the
title character uses his bizarre persona to elicit offensive statements
and behavior from, as well as to humiliate, a number of ordinary
Americans who are not in on the joke. The movie was a critical and
box office success: Borat received an Academy Award nomination for
Best Adapted Screenplay, Baron Cohen won a Golden Globe Award
for Best Actor in a Comedy or Drama, and the movie earned nearly
88
one-third of a billion dollars in ticket and DVD sales.

Borat has also produced so many lawsuits that punching in “Borat
lawsuits” on Google produces at least thirty-five pages of entries. Many
of the lawsuits were brought by the unwitting stooges. For example, Michael
Psenicska, a driving instructor with thirty-two years of experience, is
hired to give Borat a driving lesson, finds himself trapped in the passenger
seat of a car as the volatile faux Kazakhstani careens erratically down
local streets while endorsing rape, shouting obscenities at other drivers,
and asking Psenicska to be his boyfriend. Clearly discombobulated by
this unexpected behavior, an anxious Psenicska alternately ignores,
deflects, objects to, or nervously chuckles at Borat’s political incorrectness
89
while trying to prevent an accident.

Two etiquette coaches were similarly made to look like fools, and three
fraternity boys were encouraged to get drunk and “profanely disparage
90
women and mourn the fact that slavery is no longer legal.”
The Borat plaintiffs mostly lost or settled, probably for a small amount.
The defendants had a strong defense grounded in contract because the
plaintiffs had all signed agreements that were used against them,
agreements that are arguably governed under the prevailing New York
law. But one thing is obvious: the Borat producers intentionally lied to all
the plaintiffs and that fraud cost the plaintiffs both their jobs and their selfesteem, while the movie made one-third of a billion dollars. Nonetheless,
the contract was deemed to override lies, bad faith, and injury.
Of the many lawsuits brought by unwitting participants, suits by
Psenicska and the two etiquette coaches were consolidated in the Southern
District of New York against Baron Cohen, Twentieth Century Fox, and
various producers and flunkies. The district court dismissed the complaints,
91
and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed these dismissals.
92
If the complaints had been dismissed on First Amendment grounds or
because there was no substantive cause of action, I would have somewhat
88. Korobkin, supra note 31, at 53.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 53–54.
91. Psenicska v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. (Psenicska I), No. 07-CIV-10972 (LAP), 08-CIV1571 (LAP), 08-CN-1828 (LAP), 2008 WL 4185752, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2008), aff’d, 409 F. App’x 368
(2d Cir. 2009). There were several other proceedings.
92. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56–57 (1998) (dismissing the Reverend Jerry
Falwell’s suit for intentional infliction of emotional harm for printing a “satire” label “fiction” saying that
Falwell had had sex with his mother in an outhouse). But Falwell was a public figure, and the Borat
plaintiffs were not.
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less concern, but they were dismissed only on contract grounds. In the
words of the district judge, “I conclude that each Plaintiff has executed a
valid agreement releasing the claims he or she now attempts to litigate,
93
and, consequently, Defendants’ motions [to dismiss] are GRANTED.”
Psenicska had been approached by Todd Schulman, Editorial Assistant
94
to Sacha Baron Cohen, who told Psenicska that the production company
“was producing a ‘documentary about the integration of foreign people into
95
the American way of life.’” A few months later, Schulman asked Cindy
Streit, one of the etiquette instructors, “to provide etiquette training to a
Belarus dignitary and arrange a dinner party with guests to be filmed for
96
an educational documentary made for Belarus television.” At about the
same time, the other etiquette instructor, Kathie Martin, “was contacted
by Schulman to provide dining etiquette training to a foreign reporter
97
whose travel experiences were being filmed . . . for Belarus television.”
All these statements were false. Baron Cohen had starred in a British
television program called Da Ali G Show, which involved similar setups of
celebrities and politicians who did not realize that they were not in a real
interview, but he and his former program were largely unknown in the
98
United States. Each of the plaintiffs was asked to sign a document entitled
99
“Standard Consent Agreement” (“Agreement”). Schulman described it
100
to Martin as a “standard release form.” The district court wrote:
[T]he Agreements signed by the various Plaintiffs herein are identical
in all material respects. They set forth each Plaintiff’s consent to appear in
a “documentary-style . . . motion picture” intended “to reach a young
adult audience by using entertaining content and formats.” Each
Agreement states that the relevant Plaintiff:
specifically, but without limitation, waives, and agrees not to
bring at any time in the future, any claims against the Producer,
or against any of its assignees or licensees or anyone associated
with the Film, that include assertions of (a) infringement of
rights or publicity or misappropriation (such as any allegedly
improper or unauthorized use of the Participant’s name or
likeness or image), . . . (d) intrusion (such as any allegedly
offensive behavior or questioning or any invasion of
privacy), . . . (m) prima facie tort, . . . [and] (n) fraud (such as
any alleged deception or surprise about the Film or this
consent agreement).

93. Psenicska I, 2008 WL 4185752, at *1.
94. Borat: Cultural Learnings of America for Make Benefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan, IMDB,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0443453/fullcredits (last visited May 10, 2015).
95. Psenicska I, 2008 WL 4185752, at *1.
96. Id. at *2.
97. Id. at *3.
98. Kathie Martin’s husband had some familiarity with the Da Ali G Show so filming was rescheduled
to avoid the husband’s being present and recognizing Baron Cohen. Id.
99. Id. at *1–3.
100. Id. at *3.
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Furthermore, each Agreement includes a merger clause which notes,
among other things, that “the Participant acknowledges that in entering
into [the Agreement], the Participant is not relying upon any promises
or statements made by anyone about the nature of the Film or the
101
identity of any other Participants or persons involved in the Film.”

The plaintiffs argued that the term “documentary-style film” was
ambiguous, thus allowing the admission of extrinsic evidence of what
102
Schulman said to them before they signed the Agreements. It should be
obvious, after the fact, that the movie was fictitious, but the district court
held “that the operative word in the phrase ‘documentary-style film’ is
103
‘style’ and not ‘documentary.’” It continued, “[t]he fact that Borat is a
fictional character, however, does nothing to diminish the fact that his
fictional story is told in the style of a true one. Indeed, Borat owes such
104
effectiveness as it may have to that very fact.” With respect to the
plaintiffs’ claims that the agreement was induced by fraud, the district court
pointed to their express disclaimers of reliance in the agreement, citing a
105
well-known New York case, Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, which the
district court was Erie-bound to follow, if applicable. The Second Circuit
106
affirmed the district court’s opinion in a short, unpublished opinion.
Danann is one of two leading New York cases on the role of merger
clauses and non-reliance agreements when fraud is claimed in the
inducement of a contract. It is a widely accepted concept that the PER
does not bar extrinsic evidence to prove that a contract was induced by
107
fraud, but some courts, mostly those in New York and Pennsylvania, have
barred extrinsic proof of the fraud when a writing contains a merger clause
saying that the writing is the entire agreement between the parties, or has
a clause stating that no representations were made outside the writing or
that the non-drafting party has not relied on any representations not
108
contained in the writing. The argument against the evidence of the
101. Id. (citations omitted).
102. Id. at *4.
103. Id. at *5.
104. Id.
105. Id. at *6 (citing Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 598 (N.Y. 1959)). For a lengthy
discussion of Danann, see 6 Linzer, supra note 14, § 25.20[B][2].
106. Psenicska v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 409 F. App’x 368 (2d Cir. 2009).
107. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214(d) (1981); 6 Linzer, supra note 14, § 25.20[A];
Justin Sweet, Promissory Fraud and the Parol Evidence Rule, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 877, 877 (1961). In the
supplement to the 1960 edition of Volume 3 of Corbin on Contracts, section 580, Corbin wrote a
comment that has been reproduced in the treatise ever since:
It is Professor Sweet’s conclusion . . . that proof of fraud, whether in the execution of the writing
or in the inducement to make it, whether it consists in the making of a fraudulent promise or in
a fraudulent representation of some fact other than intention, should never be excluded by the
“parol evidence rule.” . . . So far as it is possible to do so, Professor Sweet’s Article is now
incorporated in this treatise.
6 Linzer, supra note 14, §25.20[A] n.1.
108. 6 Linzer, supra note 14, §§ 25.20[B][1]–[B][2].
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fraud is either that the merger clause shows that the contract is totally
integrated, thus barring extrinsic evidence, or that the “no reliance” or
“no representation” language shows that the plaintiff was not injured by
any false statement.
Two years prior to Danann, the New York Court of Appeals seemed
to be moving in the opposite direction. In Sabo v. Delman, Sabo sued his
employer, Delman, a manufacturer of fashionable women’s shoes, to
rescind a contract in which Sabo had assigned the patents to a shoe cutting
109
machine that he had invented, apparently in exchange for royalties. Sabo
claimed that Delman had falsely represented that he would finance the
venture and use his best efforts to get the machine adopted by other shoe
110
manufacturers. The contract between Sabo and Delman contained a
merger clause, and the lower courts had dismissed the action pursuant to
111
the PER. The New York Court of Appeals, the highest court in the State,
112
unanimously reversed. In his opinion, Judge Stanley Fuld wrote that since
the PER did not bar extrinsic proof of fraud, a merger clause did not either:
Indeed, if it were otherwise, a defendant would have it in his power to
perpetrate a fraud with immunity, depriving the victim of all redress, if
he simply has the foresight to include a merger clause in the agreement.
113
Such, of course, is not the law.

But only two years later, the same court decided Danann. There, the
plaintiff, who had bought the lease on a building, sought damages for
fraud, claiming that the seller had made oral misrepresentations “as to
the operating expenses of the building and as to the profits to be derived
114
from the investment.” But the court of appeals, over a dissent by Judge
Fuld, held that extrinsic proof of the alleged misrepresentations was barred
because the contract contained the following language:
The Purchaser has examined the premises agreed to be sold and is familiar
with the physical condition thereof. The Seller has not made and does
not make any representations as to the physical condition, rents, leases,
expenses, operation or any other matter or thing specifically set forth, and
the Purchaser hereby expressly acknowledges that no such representations
have been made, and the Purchaser further acknowledges that it has
inspected the premises and agrees to take the premises ‘as is’ . . . . It is
understood and agreed that all understandings and agreements heretofore
had between the parties hereto are merged in this contract, which alone
fully and completely expresses their agreement, and that the same is
entered into after full investigation, neither party relying upon any statement
or representation, not embodied in this contract, made by the other.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Sabo v. Delman, 143 N.E.2d 906, 907 (N.Y. 1957).
Id.
Id. at 909.
Id.
Id.
Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 598 (N.Y. 1959).
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The Purchaser has inspected the buildings standing on said premises
115
and is thoroughly acquainted with their condition.

The majority distinguished this language from a general merger
clause, agreeing that a general merger clause would not bar extrinsic proof
116
of fraud. Note, however, that the clause in Danann deals primarily with
the physical condition of the buildings and has only one reference to leases
and expenses among all the other matters listed. Fuld, widely recognized
for many years as the best judge on that court and rarely a demonstrative
dissenter, wrote a dissent that built upon his argument in Delman:
If a party has actually induced another to enter into a contract by means
of fraud and so the complaint before us alleges I conceive that language
may not be devised to shield him from the consequences of fraud. . . .
“The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction would no longer be
117
the rule but the exception.”

He continued by arguing that the clause in Danann was incredibly broad,
covering virtually everything, including, but certainly not limited to,
expenses and operations, the specific matters that the plaintiff was suing
118
over. Fuld quoted Judge Augustus N. Hand:
“[T]he ingenuity of draftsmen is sure to keep pace with the demands of
wrongdoers, and if a deliberate fraud may be shielded by a clause in a
contract that the writing contains every representation made by way of
inducement, or that utterances shown to be untrue were not an
inducement to the agreement,” a fraudulent seller would have a simple
119
method of obtaining immunity for his misconduct.

The New York courts have continued this running battle for more
than fifty years—not over whether fraud took place, but whether a clause
is a general merger clause (extrinsic evidence of fraud allowed) or a
nonrepresentation or non-reliance clause (extrinsic evidence excluded).
In Pennsylvania, the other state that has been debating this issue for time
120
immemorial, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made a further distinction.
According to the Pennsylvania court, a general merger clause bars evidence
of fraud in the inducement of a contract or a false statement of fact that
121
induced a party to enter into a contract—the most common form of fraud.
However, a general merger clause cannot bar evidence of fraud in the
execution of the contract (sometimes called fraud in the factum)—
122
misleading the signer about what she was physically signing. It seems
quite certain that most courts will refuse to give weight to language in a

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 600 (Fuld, J., dissenting).
Id. at 602.
Id. (quoting Arnold v. Nat’l Analine & Chem. Co., Inc., 20 F.2d 364, 369 (2d Cir. 1927)).
See Bardwell v. Willis Co., 100 A.2d 102 (Pa. 1953).
Id.
See id.
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contract that a party has signed because she was tricked, not about the
contents of the contract but about what the document was. If she did not
understand what the document was, how can a clause in the contract bar
her attempt to avoid it?
But isn’t there a strong argument that the documents the Borat
plaintiffs signed misled them about what they were signing, making the
case one of fraud in the execution? To begin with, the agreements were
123
labeled “Standard Consent Agreement,” and Schulman described one
124
to Martin as a “standard release form.” In fact, however, there was
nothing standard about these forms. It is apparent that they were
carefully tailored to cover the deception involved in the run-up to Borat.
While some of the other waivers might have appeared in any acting
contract, surely the waiver of “(d) intrusion (such as any allegedly offensive
behavior or questioning or any invasion of privacy) . . . [and] (n) fraud
(such as any alleged deception or surprise about the Film or this consent
agreement),” was specially tailored to cover exactly what the producers
125
and Baron Cohen were planning to do when the cameras were running.
And the merger clause was just as tailored, stating, “the Participant
acknowledges that in entering into [the agreement], the Participant is not
relying upon any promises or statements made by anyone about the
nature of the Film or the identity of any other Participants or persons
126
involved in the Film.” This analysis might have been enough to relieve
the district court of its Erie obligation to apply Danann because, pursuant to
this reading, the case was inapposite.
Neither the New York district court nor the Court of Appeals stated
that it was required by Erie to apply Sabo v. Delman. Neither court even
mentioned Sabo. In fact, this is a further example of courts applying
boilerplate writing to override the obvious fact that the plaintiffs fully
relied on the lies they were told. They may have been gullible. They may
have been carried away by the idea of being in a movie, even one that
was only going to be shown in Belarus, but they certainly relied on
exactly what the boilerplate said they were not relying on.
In his article on Borat, Korobkin puts enormous weight on the “duty to
read,” despite recognizing that drafters frequently load the dice against nondrafters. This is despite having shown in both his “bounded rationality”
127
128
article, as well as in the Borat piece, why it is understandable that
almost no one actually reads a contract. In a Subpart entitled “Risks to

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See supra text accompanying note 99 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying note 100 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying note 101.
See supra text accompanying note 101 (emphasis added).
See generally Korobkin, supra note 29.
See generally Korobkin, supra note 31.
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Nondrafting Parties,” he says that most of the Subpart “contends that
the intuition that ‘reading’ is cheap is wrong, at least in the context of the
130
Borat Problem.” Nonetheless, what he calls “the Borat Problem” is that
if we abandon using merger, nonrepresentation, and non-reliance clauses,
unscrupulous nondrafters will systematically cheat the trusting drafters of
contracts by claiming oral fraud if the drafters do not use boilerplate
131
language heavily weighted against the reader. I find this silly. In the
Borat litigation, few if any observers would doubt that the stooges were
telling the truth when they said that they didn’t realize that they were
being made fun of, and I don’t think many people think that if they had
known the truth, the plaintiffs would have let themselves be made laughing
stocks for $350 to $500.
Korobkin’s “Borat Solution” is primarily to require what he calls
132
“specific assent.” This would require a “clear statement” that the writing
takes precedence over prior oral statements and “realistic notice,” some
133
way of calling the disclaimer to the nondrafter’s attention. He invites
the parties to negotiate the terms, use neutral standard terms, or require
the nondrafter to check off certain boxes. But he does not even consider
requiring including a statement that reads, “THIS STATEMENT
CONTRADICTS WHAT I JUST SAID TO YOU.” And it is hard to see
how any of these prophylactic rules will really overcome the widespread
unwillingness or inability to read a contract that Korobkin demonstrates
134
so well in both articles.
To me there is an answer, but it is not an answer that will please those
who put so much weight on written contracts. To be sure, memories slip and
people “misremember” in ways that favor their interests. And a written
document is usually more accurate than memory. But certainly, in the
situation of a very plausible claim of fraud against one of the exculpatory
clauses like those in Borat, the solution is to allow the writing into evidence
against the nondrafter, not to bar the nondrafter’s contrary evidence.
The lawyer representing the drafter can argue to the jury that the written
word—which argues against fraud having taken place—is more trustworthy

129. Id. at 7688.
130. Id. at 77. In the pages that follow, Korobkin discusses psychological game theory and empirical
studies showing direct costs such as the complexity of reading legal documents, which have often deliberately
made difficult and lengthy to discourage reading, “confirmation bias,” indirect costs such as undermining
trust in that the drafter is led to think the nondrafter doesn’t trust her, loss aversion from the sense of giving
up the gains that the oral misrepresentations have led the nondrafter to think he is getting, and the impact
on efficiency of the amount of time that would be needed to read every contract. Id. at 78–88.
131. Id. at 51–52.
132. Id. at 92.
133. Id. at 93.
134. What about the fact that many nondrafters will not have the education to understand the
disclaimer or won’t know that they need to bring their reading glasses, as happened to Michael Psenicska,
who thought he was giving a driving lesson, not signing a “contract”?
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than the nondrafter’s arguably self-serving testimony. But the court
135
should not bar the oral testimony. While many people do not trust juries,
and some may favor the underdog, the judge can still exclude untrustworthy
136
evidence without the iron curtain of the PER. As Arthur Corbin wrote
many years ago with respect to interpretation through extrinsic evidence:
The more bizarre and unusual an asserted interpretation is, the more
convincing must be the testimony that supports it. Just when the court
should quit listening to testimony that white is black and that a dollar is
fifty cents is a matter for sound judicial discretion and common sense.
137
Even these things may be true for some purposes.

3.

“Notice and Choice” in Online Privacy

Most of us are concerned about how private entities gather
information about us. Whether it is from our use of online cookies, credit
cards, or retailers’ loyal customer discounts, there is a lot of information
that other people or companies have about us. Congress or federal
administrative agencies could impose laws or regulations limiting how
cyber information gatherers may use it with respect to those who provide
the information, since many of us do not realize how much information
we are providing or what the recipients are doing with it. As opposed to
government regulation, however, our current approach uses the motif of
contract, called “notice and choice.” Companies need only provide a rather
generalized and indeterminate statement of what they propose to do with
respect to privacy and then offer the consumer the choice of accepting
these terms or not taking part. This is really just another contract of
adhesion, with the “notice” often being quite long, hard to understand,
incomplete, and full of vague words. While there have been several
important statements of underlying privacy principles over the last forty
years, these have been ideals to reach voluntarily rather than rules to be
followed. Notice and choice is superficially a nongovernmental sharing of
responsibility, with both parties designing a regime of privacy protection.

135. Korobkin cites for this the hoary old statement that “[t]he average jury will . . . lean strongly in favor
of the side which is threatened with possible injustice and certain hardship by the enforcement of the
writing.” Korobkin, supra note 31, at 73 n.98 (quoting Charles T. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as
a Procedural Device for Controlling the Jury, 41 Yale L.J. 365, 366 (1932)).He then quotes Corbin’s
1944 Yale Law Journal article as support, but in fact Corbin was skeptical of this point. Id. (quoting
Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 Yale L.J. 603, 608–09 (1944)). Professor Korobkin
responded to a late draft of this Article with a gracious e-mail saying that he agreed with my
conclusion that the plaintiffs should have been permitted to put on their evidence before a jury, and
that his article had said this, based on his proposed requirement of “specific assent.” See Korobkin,
supra note 31, at 102–04. With the greatest respect, I still feel that he puts too much emphasis on the
written word, which remains a trap for the unwary in cases like this one.
136. On the related but more general issue of the role of the merger clause in triggering the PER,
see 6 Linzer, supra note 14, §§ 25.8, 25.8[G], 25.20.
137. 3 Corbin, supra note 87, § 579. He footnoted his third sentence with examples of Mexican and
Confederate dollars. Id. § 579 n.55; 6 Linzer, supra note 14, § 25.25.
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But in reality, the consumer has inadequate information, even in the
unlikely case that she reads the “notice” carefully. This contractual
138
approach has left consumers with little in the way of protection.
4.

Baseball’s Reserve Clause

For nearly 100 years, from about 1880 to 1975, the “reserve clause”
in baseball contracts automatically gave Major League Baseball teams
(that is the owners) a right to their players’ services for the season after
the players’ contracts expired, regardless of whether the players signed a
139
new contract. This made it impossible for the players to offer their services
to other teams and greatly weakened their ability to negotiate a new
140
contract with their present team. All of the teams insisted on the same
clause, and the Supreme Court, on three separate occasions, beginning in
1922 and covering nearly fifty years, refused to apply antitrust laws to
141
baseball. Remarkably, the Supreme Court had, by 1969, found every
other professional sport covered by antitrust laws, but it still refused to
apply them to baseball. The third challenge came in 1969, when an excellent
African-American outfielder named Curt Flood, backed by the Players
142
Union, challenged the reserve clause, drawing parallels with the civil rights
movement. Flood received hate mail for being “untrue” to baseball and
143
wrecked his career, his health, and, ultimately, his life. We (and at least
some players) now recognize Flood as a courageous man who led to the

138. My discussion is based on the facts unearthed in an unpublished study conducted at New York
University by Florencia Marotta-Wurgler. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does “Notice and Choice” Disclosure
Regulation Work? An Empirical Study of Privacy Policies (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper, 2015)
(on file with author). The reporters for the ALI’s Restatement of Data Privacy Principles initially adopted
a notice and choice approach, and asked in their Preliminary Draft No. 2, dated Oct. 24, 2014, whether the
Restatement should be reoriented more toward a contract approach. After meeting with the Advisors, the
Reporters indicated that they would abandon notice and choice, and appear to have withdrawn their
question of reorientation toward contract.
139. Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
140. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 258 (1972).
141. In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
which involved organized baseball’s forcing the rival Federal League out of business, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes wrote that baseball was an “amusement” and not commerce and was thus not covered by antitrust
laws. 259 U.S. at 209. On two later occasions, attempts were directed specifically against the reserve clause,
but the Court relied on Congress’s inaction to conclude that Congress had approved of the Court’s reading
of the Sherman Act. Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 356 (1953); Flood, 407 U.S. at 258. Among the
things wrong with these later decisions, they ignored the radical change in Commerce Clause jurisprudence
beginning fifteen years after Holmes wrote Federal Baseball Club, sixteen years before Toolson, and
fifty years before Flood v. Kuhn. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
142. Flood, 407 U.S. at 258.
143. See Allen Barra, How Curt Flood Changed Baseball and Killed His Career in the Process, Atlantic
(July 12, 2011, 2:05 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2011/07/how-curt-flood-changedbaseball-and-killed-his-career-in-the-process/241783. HBO has now produced a documentary as well. The
Curious Case of Curt Flood (HBO 2011).
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players’ becoming millionaires, even though he lost his case in the Supreme
144
145
Court. He saw the issue as one of civil rights, not just contract law.
Though attacks on the underlying unfairness and irrationality of the
reserve clause had failed for so long, it was finally defeated on a very
clever reading of the players’ contracts. In 1975, two excellent pitchers,
Andy Messersmith of the Los Angeles Dodgers and Dave McNally of the
Baltimore Orioles, refused to sign their contracts and played the 1975
146
season without a contract. They then argued to an arbitrator that they
had satisfied the reserve clause by playing in 1975, and that, therefore,
147
their 1974 contract reserve clauses no longer bound them. The arbitrator
148
ruled in their favor and the owners promptly fired him. Because an
overall collective bargaining agreement governed all major league players,
the decision signaled the death knell for the reserve clause, after 95 years
and three trips to the Supreme Court.
Despite the obvious injustice of the reserve clause and the irrationality
of applying the antitrust laws to every other sport except for baseball, only
on a very clever reading of the contract by the players and their lawyers, and
a formalistic reading by the arbitrator, finally killed this oppressive contract
149
provision. The death of the reserve clause stands as a rare example of
the rigid written word trumping the usual tyranny of the written word,
150
leading to a redistribution of wealth from the owners to the players.

144. In their pioneering “inside the Supreme Court” book The Brethren, Bob Woodward and Scott
Armstrong report a wonderfully unverifiable piece of Supreme Court law clerks’ gossip to the effect that
Chief Justice Burger switched his vote in Flood v. Kuhn to give Justice Blackmun the deciding vote to defeat
Flood’s case in exchange for Blackmun’s delaying his opinion in Roe v. Wade just long enough for Burger not
to be embarrassed when he swore in Richard Nixon, who had appointed both of them and had run in 1972
on an anti-abortion platform. Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme
Court 224 (1979).
145. See Barra, supra note 143.
146. Patrick K. Thornton, Legal Decisions That Shaped Modern Baseball 182 (2012).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 183.
149. And even after this, the union and the owners negotiated a deal that still left younger players and
all minor leaguers subject to a modified reserve system. Major League Baseball Players Association 2012–
2016 Basic Agreement, art. XX.B(1) (2011), http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/pdf/cba_english.pdf. Maybe that is
a fair result; it was a major improvement. At least it was the product of hard bargaining, if only between the
owners and the Major League Baseball Players Association.
150. Since baseball franchises are now being sold for hundreds of millions of dollars, it has not seemed
to have harmed the owners. Whether fans paying high prices for tickets feel that they have not been affected
is less clear.
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The Marchetti and Snepp Cases

Two cases involving former Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA” or
“Agency”) employees writing books illustrate the way that contracts can
muddle thinking, even in the Supreme Court, and lead to the weakening
of the freedom of speech and the press. We start from a basic distrust of
151
prior restraints to free speech. While subsequent punishment is sometimes
oppressive, at least it permits important information to get out. A prior
restraint silences the speaker and keeps the people from learning what the
speaker had to say. If classified information is involved, there is a stronger
152
case for restraints on the speech, but even this is not absolute. But where
the speech is merely critical of government or embarrassing to it, legislation
requiring preclearance would be questionable if not per se unconstitutional.
Nonetheless, the CIA requires all employees to sign a “secrecy
153
agreement” as a condition of employment. Victor Marchetti signed one
154
when he joined the Agency in 1955. The agreement provided only that
he would never divulge “any classified information, intelligence or
knowledge” unless authorized to do so in writing by the Director of
155
Central Intelligence. Marchetti rose to be Executive Assistant to the
156
Deputy Director, but resigned after fourteen years with the Agency. At
that time, he signed a “Secrecy Oath” in which he agreed not to divulge
“any information relating to the national defense and security,” not
157
limited to classified material. Marchetti then wrote several magazine
articles and a thinly disguised novel dealing with the CIA in an unflattering
158
manner. After the government sought an injunction against Marchetti
writing additional books, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia ordered him to submit to the Agency thirty days in advance
of release to anyone “any writing, fictional or non-fictional, relating to the
159
Agency or to intelligence.” The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
in a thoughtful opinion by Chief Judge Clement Haynsworth, upheld the
injunction as far as it related to classified material not previously disclosed
publicly, since that had been included in the 1955 Secrecy Contract and was,
160
in the court’s view, properly the subject of a prior restraint. But
Haynsworth reversed the district court as to the rest, writing:

151. See N.Y. Times Co., Inc. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam);
Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
152. Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. 713.
153. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1316 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
154. Id. at 1312.
155. Id. at 1312 n.1.
156. Id. at 1312.
157. Id. at 1312 n.2.
158. Id. at 1313.
159. Id. at 1311.
160. Id. at 1316–18.
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Marchetti by accepting employment with the CIA and by signing a
secrecy agreement did not surrender his First Amendment right of free
speech. The agreement is enforceable only because it is not a violation
of those rights. We would decline enforcement of the secrecy oath signed
when he left the employment of the CIA to the extent that it purports
to prevent disclosure of unclassified information, for, to that extent, the
161
oath would be in contravention of his First Amendment rights.

The Court of Appeals appended to this paragraph an important statement:
“There was no apparent consideration for the secrecy oath, so that it would
be, generally, unenforceable on that ground. The oath has the support of
the moral force underlying solemn oaths, but it added nothing to the
162
Government’s arsenal of legal rights in the context of this proceeding.”
It continued: “Thus Marchetti retains the right to speak and write about
the CIA and its operations, and to criticize it as any other citizen may,
but he may not disclose classified information obtained by him during the
163
course of his employment which is not already in the public domain.”
Marchetti and his co-author submitted the book, The CIA and the
Cult of Intelligence, to the CIA, which sought to excise 339 passages, but
164
The
the authors resisted and only 168 passages were removed.
distinguished publisher Alfred A. Knopf published the book with the CIAcensored portions replaced with blanks and bold-face type used for passages
165
that the CIA did not censor but did dispute. While Marchetti and his
publisher were undoubtedly unhappy with this result, Haynsworth’s
analysis was perceptive in seeing the problem as less one of contract and
more of public policy and constitutional law, and in refusing to allow the
contracts Marchetti had signed to override the First Amendment.
Unlike the Fourth Circuit in Marchetti, the Supreme Court looked
166
at a similar but distinct contract with an almost total lack of sensitivity.
Having seen what happened to Marchetti, Frank Snepp, another former
CIA agent, was less open. He wrote Decent Interval, a very critical account
of our last days in Saigon, and illustrated how the United States cast aside
the South Vietnamese who had helped us knowing they would face
horrendous reprisals from our successful enemies, the Viet Cong and the
167
North Vietnamese. Snepp made a secret arrangement with Random

161. Id. at 1317.
162. Id. at 1317 n.6.
163. Id. at 1317. The Fourth Circuit also said that “[b]ecause we are dealing with a prior restraint upon
speech,” the CIA was required to respond to any submission within thirty days and “since First Amendment
rights are involved, we think Marchetti would be entitled to judicial review of any action by the CIA
disapproving publication of the material.” Id. (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57–58 (1965)).
164. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence xix (1983)
(Publisher’s Note).
165. Id.
166. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 520 (1980).
167. See generally Frank Snepp, Decent Interval: An Insider’s Account of Saigon’s Indecent
End Told by the CIA’s Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam (1977).
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House. The manuscript was typed and printed in secret, and the bound
169
volumes were put in bookstores before there was any publicity. The
government could not seek to enjoin publication of the book since it was
170
already out, so it sued for damages.
There was a major difference between the agreement Marchetti had
signed and the agreement Snepp had signed: Snepp’s agreement was not
limited to classified information; it required preapproval before publication
of “any information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or
intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term of [his]
171
employment.” The government conceded that the book contained no
172
classified information. Nevertheless, the Court wrote:
Whether Snepp violated his trust does not depend upon whether his
book actually contained classified information. The Government does
not deny—as a general principle—Snepp’s right to publish unclassified
information. Nor does it contend—at this stage of the litigation—that
Snepp’s book contains classified material. The Government simply
claims that, in light of the special trust reposed in him and the
agreement that he signed, Snepp should have given the CIA an
opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to publish
would compromise classified information or sources. Neither of the
Government’s concessions undercuts its claim that Snepp’s failure to
173
submit to prepublication review was a breach of trust.

The opinion is very deferential to the CIA. The Court found, based
on a conclusory affidavit submitted by a former Director of Central
Intelligence, that the publication, even without any classified information,
compromised the CIA, and that by taking the CIA job, Snepp entered
into a trust arrangement that he breached. Justice John Paul Stevens,
joined by Justices William J. Brennan Jr. and Thurgood Marshall,
disputed these points as matters of contract, trust, and restitution law, as
well as the underlying premise that the government could, through
contract, obtain a blanket injunction against the publication of unclassified
174
information without prior government approval.
Since the CIA had presumably read Decent Interval when it was
published, it should have been able to point to content in the book it
would have objected to if Snepp had submitted the manuscript. Instead,
the majority found that Snepp’s act of not submitting it in advance
constituted a breach of trust—without any showing of injury—and

168. See Irreparable Harm, Frank Snepp, http://franksnepp.com/irreparable-harm (last visited
May 10, 2015).
169. Id.
170. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 509. This end run seems to have greatly offended the majority, leading to much
of the Court’s breach of trust reasoning.
171. Id. at 508.
172. Id. at 510.
173. Id. at 511.
174. Id. at 516–17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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imposed a constructive trust on his profits. The Court also affirmed the
Court of Appeals’ injunction requiring Snepp to submit all future writings
176
to the CIA. Given our basic distrust of prior restraint, making this
contractual prior restraint something that could trigger total forfeiture of
Snepp’s profits just because he failed to comply with his contractual duty,
absent any proof of injury to the CIA, is draconian and insensitive to
Snepp’s right to speak and the public’s right to know. The only apparent
injury was criticism of how we made our chaotic escape from Vietnam
when Saigon was falling—a matter that, while embarrassing in the
177
extreme, was no secret. Moreover, the injunction was not limited to
classified material; it served as a prior restraint on anything that Snepp
might write about the CIA. Thus, the majority allowed a contract required
as a condition of employment by a federal government agency to permit
a prior restraint much beyond what could have been allowed by law.
Snepp reflects deference not merely to contract, but to a freewheeling
sort of contractarianism. The Supreme Court found a breach of trust without
any sort of trust instrument. It applied that notion of trust to everything
mentioned in the contract Snepp had signed, and mechanically found that
the very act of not complying with the prior restraint required by the
secrecy agreement was the breach of trust, without requiring the CIA to
explain what it would have objected to and how the material injured it.
The government should not be allowed to circumvent the First Amendment
simply by requiring an employee, even a CIA agent, to sign a contract.
6.

More on Contract Overriding the Bill of Rights: Cohen v. Cowles
Media Company

In another case in which contract overcame constitutional rights,
178
Cohen v. Cowles Media Company, the Supreme Court held that a
newspaper was liable on promissory estoppel grounds because it broke
its reporter’s promise of secrecy to a slimy politician who was anonymously
179
trying to leak negative information on an opponent. The majority opinion
in the managed to be wrong on both contract and First Amendment
180
grounds. Even more, it was legally tone deaf because it did not appreciate

175. Id. at 516 (majority opinion). Justice Stevens in his dissent argued that a constructive trust was
an inappropriate remedy, quoting the Court of Appeals, which had written that “a constructive trust
depends on the concept of unjust enrichment rather than deterrence and punishment.” Id. at 523 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 509, 516 (majority opinion).
177. The public importance of Snepp’s book is shown by Last Days in Vietnam, a documentary released
in October 2014, which revisits, forty years later, our shameful exit. Last Days in Vietnam (PBS 2014).
178. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
179. Id. at 670.
180. Cohen is also noteworthy because it appears in both contracts and constitutional law casebooks.
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how these grounds were intertwined. Dan Cohen was a Republican
apparatchik in Minnesota, working for an advertising agency employed
182
by the Independent Republican candidate for governor, Wheelock
Whitney. Cohen approached several reporters saying he had information
which may or may not relate to a candidate in the upcoming election,
and if you will give me a promise of confidentiality, that is that I will be
treated as an anonymous source, that my name will not appear in any
material with this, and you will also agree that you’re not going to
pursue with a question of who my source is, then I’ll furnish you with
183
the documents.

The reporters knew that Cohen was working for the Independent
184
Republicans, and they could have guessed that the leaked information
would be detrimental to a candidate of the rival Democratic Farmer-Labor
Party (“DFL”). Four reporters agreed not to disclose Cohen’s name and
were given information that the DFL’s candidate for Lieutenant Governor,
Marlene Johnson, had twice been arrested nearly twenty-five years earlier,
185
once for unlawful assembly and once for petty theft. Further investigation
revealed that she had been arrested for unlawful assembly at a rally
against the state’s not hiring enough minority workers on a construction
186
project and that the charges were later dropped. She had been convicted
on the theft charge, which was for failure to pay for six dollars’ worth of
187
sewing materials. But this was said to have happened while she was
distraught over her father’s recent death, and the conviction was vacated
188
the following year. The Minnesota Supreme Court said in a footnote,
“These circumstances, of which Cohen was apparently unaware and
which cast a somewhat different light on the two incidents, were likely to
set in motion a boomerang effect. This suggestion of a boomerang may
have prompted some of the editors to believe that Cohen’s identity was
189
newsworthy.”
In any event, at the Tribune and the Dispatch, two newspapers
whose reporters had given the confidentiality promise to Cohen, the

181. In fairness to Justice Byron White, who wrote for the majority, he did find that the Court had
jurisdiction because the Minnesota Supreme Court had raised a federal question intertwined with state
promissory estoppel law. Id. at 663, 667–68. The Minnesota Court had refused to enforce the reporters’
promises through promissory estoppel because, in its view, the First Amendment disabled the requirement
that enforcement be necessary to avoid injustice. Id.
182. In Minnesota, the Democratic Party is known, for historic reasons, as the DFL, while the
Republican Party was called the “Independent Republican” party from 1975 to 1995. Daniel J. Elazar et
al., Minnesota Politics and Government 85 (1999).
183. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 201 n.2.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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editors believed that Cohen’s name, and his connection with the Whitney
campaign were themselves newsworthy and decided to print Cohen’s
190
name. Another reporter for the Tribune had independently found a
191
link to Cohen and to the person who had unearthed the documents. The
newspapers had several options: (1) do not print the story at all, (2) print
the story without revealing the source, (3) say that the source was someone
close to the Whitney campaign, or (4) print Cohen’s name with or
without the name of his employer. The Tribune had endorsed the ticket
192
that included Johnson. Its editors felt that they could not refuse to print
the story, and that printing it with only a reference to it coming from a
Whitney supporter would have cast aspersions on other people connected
193
with the campaign. After a heated editorial “huddle,” the Tribune
printed both Cohen’s name and that of his employer, while the Dispatch,
without as much sturm und drang, printed Cohen’s name but did not
194
mention his employer. Both papers’ reporters objected to their paper
not abiding by their promises of anonymity, and the Tribune’s reporter
195
insisted that her name not appear as the author of the article. Neither
196
paper mentioned its reporter’s confidentiality promise. In the brouhaha
that followed, Cohen was fired by the advertising agency he had been
197
working for. It is not clear whether the advertising agency fired him
because disclosure of his connection with the agency proved embarrassing
or because they disapproved of his conduct. In any event, “[t]he
newspapers [did not] dispute that Cohen was fired or otherwise forced to
198
resign as a result of the story.”
Cohen sued the Dispatch and the Tribune for breach of contract and
misrepresentation. The jury awarded Cohen $200,000 in compensatory
damages and $500,000 in punitive damages based on allegations of
199
misrepresentation. The Minnesota Court of Appeals threw out the
misrepresentation claim and the resulting punitive damages because no
scienter could be shown when the reporters made their promises but

190. Id. at 201.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 201–02.
193. Id. at 201.
194. Id. at 201–02.
195. Id. at 201.
.
196 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 253. (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). The other two media
outlets kept their reporters’ promises. Id. The Associated Press stated only that the documents “were slipped
to reporters,” and a local TV station decided not to broadcast the story at all. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 254. Cohen testified that when he had described his leaking of the documents, “his supervisor
had no reaction,” but the supervisor testified “that he was upset by what he believed were Cohen’s
unscrupulous practices.” Id. at 252. It seems undisputed that after his name came out, “Cohen’s employer
confronted him and a heated discussion ensued.” Id. at 253. Cohen said he was then fired; the employer
said he resigned. Id. at 253–54.
199. Id. at 254.
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affirmed the contract-based award of $200,000. The court found the
First Amendment inapplicable and sounded quite hostile to the
201
newspapers. Judge Gary Crippen, dissenting on the contract ground,
argued strongly that Minnesota’s enforcement of contracts was not a
compelling state interest that could override the First Amendment
interest in the dispersal of information to the public, particularly when
202
information relevant to an election was involved.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Cohen’s
203
misrepresentation claim but dismissed the contract claim. It wrote,
“The question before us, however, is not whether keeping a confidential
promise is ethically required but whether it is legally enforceable;
whether, in other words, the law should superimpose a legal obligation
on a moral and ethical obligation. The two obligations are not always
204
coextensive.” It continued, “We are not persuaded that in the special
milieu of media newsgathering a source and a reporter ordinarily believe
205
they are engaged in making a legally binding contract.” The Court
reversed the entire award, over strong dissenters who chided the press
for making promises and then hiding behind its supposed protected status
206
to avoid responsibility.
It was not until oral argument, when one of the justices on the
Minnesota Supreme Court asked about promissory estoppel, that the
207
issue that gets this case into the contracts books first emerged. The
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the claim because it felt that the
violation of the newspapers’ First Amendment rights outweighed the
208
injustice to Cohen.
When the case got to the U.S. Supreme Court, the contract and
constitutional analysis took yet another turn. The majority mentioned
but ignored the contract claim that the Minnesota Supreme Court had
209
thrown out. Instead, it held that using the First Amendment to answer
the injustice element of promissory estoppel was not a matter of
210
nonreviewable state law but instead raised a federal question. It also
held that Minnesota promissory estoppel law was a state law of general

200. Id. at 262.
201. Id. at 256–57.
202. Id. at 262–68 (Crippen, J., dissenting in part).
203. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990).
204. Id. at 203.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 205–07 (Yetka, & Kelley, JJ., dissenting). One of the dissenters spoke of “the perfidy of these
defendants, the liability for which they now seek to escape by trying to crawl under the aegis of the First
Amendment, which, in my opinion, has nothing to do with the case.” Id. at 207 (Kelley, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 204 n.5.
208. Id. at 205.
209. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 666 (1991).
210. Id. at 667–68.
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applicability from which the press had no special constitutional protection.
This point was strongly disputed by the four dissenting Justices, who
pointed out that the Court had rejected this approach with respect to tort
when it radically rewrote the law of libel in the famous case of New York
212
Times Company v. Sullivan, and when it applied Sullivan to the law of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and reversed a judgment against
Hustler Magazine for printing a “parody” suggesting that the Reverend
213
Jerry Falwell had had sex with his mother in an outhouse. The
Supreme Court majority in Cohen did not reinstate the Minnesota Court
of Appeals judgment, but sent the case back to the Minnesota Supreme
Court, saying that since it had incorrectly found promissory estoppel
inappropriate, it needed to reconsider whether promissory estoppel would
214
support the jury verdict.
While the majority was not as hostile to the press as the Minnesota
Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court dissenters had been, it
still treated promissory estoppel as sacrosanct in that it overrode the
press’s First Amendment rights in ways that tort and other state law
215
matters did not. This case stands as another example of overvaluing
contract analysis simply because it is contract—here, based on a promise
to be sure, but treating the promise as overriding other immensely
important values—specifically press coverage of questionable tactics in a
statewide election.
7.

Freestanding Nondisclosure Agreements

We have already discussed the CIA’s secrecy agreements, and we
law professionals are all familiar with confidentiality agreements and
covenants not to compete in private employment. But it is worth noting
what the government did, perhaps with good motives, while the Afghan
Taliban was holding Bowe Bergdahl prisoner. To keep the details out of
the press, “[m]embers of Bowe’s brigade [apparently 3200 to 5000 soldiers]
were required to sign nondisclosure agreements as part of their
216
paperwork to leave Afghanistan.” His parents “were required to sign a
nondisclosure agreement with the National Security Agency in order to
217
view classified and top-secret material.” While we do not know exactly

211. Id. at 668, 670.
212. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
213. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (citing in dissents of both Justice
Hary Blackmun, Cohen, 501 U.S. at 674–76, and Justice David Souter, id. at 677–78).
214. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 672. The majority also suggested that the Minnesota court could apply the state
constitution to shield the press from promissory estoppel claims of this type. Id. These hints from Justice
White suggest that the majority opinion may not have been quite as hostile to newspapers or as oblivious to
the interplay between state contract law and state and federal constitutional law as it seems at first blush.
215. See generally Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (discussing the law of nuisance).
216. Michael Hastings, The Last American Prisoner of War, Rolling Stone, June 7, 2012, at 62.
217. Id.

N - Linzer_19 (EGK) (1) (Do Not Delete)

1008

5/21/2015 12:01 AM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:971

what his parents’ agreement included, Bergdahl’s parents were then
deprived of a right to speak out against matters like government delay or to
make public statements about their son’s captivity. Soldiers who knew
anything about Bergdahl’s disappearance and captivity were also kept
quiet. Gagging what seems like more than 3000 soldiers by holding their
transfers captive is obviously unenforceable. But, especially since these
soldiers were still in uniform, the in terrorem effect of these “contracts”
surely had a chilling—more likely a corrosive—effect on their ability to
speak of what went on.
This use of contract limited what the public learned about Bowe
Bergdahl before his much publicized release in a prisoner swap in the
218
summer of 2014. Maybe the government’s use of these nondisclosure
“agreements” served a noble purpose in protecting Bergdahl from
retaliation by the Taliban, but it illustrates how contract and contract
thinking can be used to suppress information that normally should be
made available. We have no assurance that the government does not use
this technique in less compelling circumstances, and our “profound national
219
commitment” in favor of disclosure of public information and against
prior restraint raises a powerful argument against these supposed contracts.
220

III. What’s It All About, Alfie?
Contracts are about power. Not just the Hohfeldian “power” to
221
make an accepted offer legally binding, but also power in forcing
undesired terms on a weaker negotiating adversary; power in imposing
terms on a non-negotiating consumer, employee, credit card customer
and the like; power in using contract to override a party’s rights, whether
consumer, baseball player, CIA employee, or newspaper; or the power to
wriggle out of a deal because your lawyer was better than the other guy’s,
especially if the other guy is a town, a city, a union, representing many
people who will be affected by the failure of the contract. I am not saying
that we should all dance around the maypole, sing Wimoweh, and ignore
hundreds of years of contract law, not to mention the realities of life and
capitalism. I am saying that there is much more to life, and there should
be much more to contract, than formal rules that ignore the underlying
inequalities of the parties, including the greatest absences: perfect
information and a perfect market.

218. Admittedly, Michael Hastings’s article, which included information on the nondisclosure
“agreements,” was published two years before the swap for Bergdahl took place.
219. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
220. Those who are too young to get the allusion are advised to watch Alfie, a great 1966 movie
that made Michael Caine (still going and now Sir Michael) into a star, and to listen to the title song,
recorded the following year by Dionne Warwick. Alfie (Paramount Pictures 1966).
221. See Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 Yale
L.J. 169, 183 (1917).
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When we deal with contracts between parties of roughly equal power
and information, we should generally leave the contracts and the parties
222
alone. Those who build monuments to their own folly should not be
223
restrained because we think they are fools. But contract is in many
ways a matter of public law, often overwhelmingly so. And when we ignore
that intertwining of public and private law and instead fall in love with
contract and deify it as the product of individual free will, we forfeit the
public’s rights, as well as those of individuals, and hand them over to
people and companies and their lawyers who can manipulate the contract
process. Some, but not all of the examples I have given have involved
consumers. But the reserve clause, the CIA secrecy agreements, the
reporters’ promises of anonymity, and the government’s use of
freestanding nondisclosure “agreements,” do not involve consumers,
though many of them are contracts of adhesion, writ large. While
formalism and strict application of formal contract law are not always
224
beneficial to those in power, on the whole, they benefit those who know
how to exploit the status quo. And the status quo, particularly in contract,
mostly benefits the strong.
Contract law chooses to ignore disparate power. It is time to change
that approach. It will not be easy; we obviously do not want to make
consumer contracts unenforceable, since that would deprive consumers
225
of capacity to contract, as Arthur Leff told us nearly fifty years ago.
But we need to cut loose from much of the formalism and rigid belief in
contract as an end in itself and a matter of private volition, and recognize
the many forms of contract, or at least transactions labeled as contract,
that do not involve the freedom that we blithely speak of as free will and
freedom of contract. That would reduce the evil side of contract. We will
never get rid of all of it entirely, and probably do not want to, but
reduction of evil is a good first step. And stamping a lot of it out is even
better.

222. See Revisiting the Contracts Scholarship of Stewart Macaulay, supra note 13.
223. Chamberlin v. Parker, 45 N.Y. 569 (1871); John Edward Murray, Jr., Murray on Contracts
760 (5th ed. 2011).
224. See supra Part II.B.4 (discussing the demise of baseball’s reserve clause).
225. See Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 485 (1967).
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